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Abstract
I survey the use of nonlinear pricing as a method of price discrimination, both
with monopoly and oligopoly supply. Topics covered include an analysis of when it
is protable to o¤er quantity discounts and bundle discounts, connections between
second- and third-degree price discrimination, the use of market demand functions
to calculate nonlinear tari¤s, the impact of consumers with bounded rationality,
bundling arrangements between separate sellers, and the choice of prices for upgrades
and add-on products.
1 Introduction
In this article I discuss the form of price discrimination known as nonlinear pricing, where
the price you pay for something depends on what else you buy. A stroll down the aisle
of a supermarket reveals how larger quantities of a product are (usually) proportionately
cheaper than smaller quantities, as well as opportunities to buy three for the price of two
on selected items. Most of the services connected to a home electricity, telephone, water,
television, broadband are sold via tari¤s where the average price for a unit depends on
how much of that service you consume and/or which other services you take from the same
supplier. A newspaper consists of a bundle of distinct articles, and may itself be cheaper
with a subscription than when casually purchased from a store. You may get a discount
on a car rental when you book a ight, and the ight may be cheaper if youve own
frequently with the airline (or its partners) before. A value mealat a fast food outlet
is cheaper than its components would be if purchased separately. Likewise, the Sciences
Online Collectionfrom Annual Reviews in 2016 is available at a 15% discount compared
with separate purchase.
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It is useful to distinguish various cases along two dimensions: whether there is a single
product or multiple products, and whether there is a single seller or multiple sellers. Table
1 presents the situations discussed in this paper.
single product multiple products
single seller quantity discounts bundle discounts
product-line pricing multiproduct nonlinear pricing
[section 2] [section 3]
multiple sellers one-stop shopping mix-and-match shopping
add-on pricing inter-rm bundling
[section 4.1] [section 4.2]
Table 1: The plan of the paper
In some cases a series of sports events, say it is not always clear-cut whether a consumer
buys several units of one product or one unit of each of several distinct products. In
economic terms, though, the crucial distinction between the two scenarios is that with a
single product a consumers utility depends only on the number of units they buy, while
with multiple products she cares about which units they buy.
With a single product there is a natural order to the decisions the consumer makes. To
buy two units of a product, a consumer can be considered to buy the rstunit (at price
p1, say) followed by the secondunit (at incremental price p2). She cannot buy the second
unit on its own. This is similar to the situation where a seller o¤ers a menu of qualities,
rather than quantities, and a consumer who buys a high-quality product can be considered
to purchase a basicproduct together with an upgrade, and there is no value to the
upgrade in isolation. Another situation with this choice structure is when a consumer buys
a core product, and an optional add-onproduct is available only to consumers with the
core product. Although these latter situations, which concern product-line pricing, do not
strictly fall under the denition of nonlinear pricing, the issues raised are in many respects
similar and it makes sense to include them in this article.
This natural order implies that the single-product pricing problem can often be simpli-
ed by treating each incremental unit as a separate market. That is to say, given the
distribution of incremental valuations for the nth unit in the consumer population, one can
2
calculate the most protable price for this unit in isolation. This approach does not always
generate the optimal tari¤ some consumers might purchase initial units solely to obtain a
good deal overall but it often does, and in these cases nonlinear pricing is just an instance
of third-degree price discrimination where price-cost markups reect the elasticity of the
relevant demand function. This method is known as the demand prole approach to
nonlinear pricing.1 Regardless of whether the demand prole approach is valid, we will see
that a seller o¤ers a quantity discount (say, p2 < p1) when demand for second unit is more
elastic than demand for the rst unit. In the related situations with product-line pricing, it
does not make sense to speak of a quantity discount per se, but instead one can investigate
how the markup for the upgrade/add-on compares with that for the basic item. Because
of this natural choice order, in competitive settings it usually makes sense in these cases to
suppose that consumers are one-stop shoppers, and cannot buy the basic product from
one seller and the upgrade (or similar) from another.
The multiproduct pricing problem has a di¤erent structure, without this natural order
over consumer decisions. With unit demand for two underlying products, a consumer has
three options: product 1 on its own, product 2 on its own and the bundle of both products.
The demand prole approach does not usually seem to be useful or even well dened
with multiple products. Here, consumers have a choice for their rst unit(it could be
product 1 or product 2), and there is no coherent notion of the incremental price or incre-
mental valuation for the second unit, since that depends on which product was purchased
initially. In competitive settings, it usually makes sense to suppose that some consumers
purchase distinct products from di¤erent sellers that is, they mix and match at least
when linear pricing is used. When competing sellers o¤er bundle discounts, however, arti-
cial shopping costs are introduced which encourages more consumers to become one-stop
shoppers.
We will see that o¤ering a bundle discount is protable when demand for the bundle
is more elastic than demand for each product separately. A corollary of this is that even
when products are completely unrelated it is optimal to introduce a bundle discount. A
related insight is that bundling acts to reduce the sellers uncertainly about a consumers
surplus, just as a broad investment portfolio allows for more predictable returns. (This
e¤ect is most marked when many items are in the bundle, when the law of large numbers
1Wilson (1993) demonstrates the widespread usefulness of the demand prole approach.
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can apply.) With a single seller, the decrease in consumer heterogeneity due to bundling
often leads to higher prots and reduced consumer surplus. With multiple sellers, though,
it can sharpen competition, so sellers are harmed and consumers benet from this form of
price discrimination.
2 Single-Seller, Single-Product Analysis
2.1 Nonlinear pricing with discrete choices
It is useful initially to discuss nonlinear (and related) pricing in a setting in which consumers
have a binary choice from the monopoly seller, and can either buy a basicor a premium
product. (Analysis with continuous choices is presented in the next section.) Here, the
premium product might consist of greater quantity of the underlying product, relative to
the basic product. That is, the seller supplies either a small or a largequantity, as
with a café which sells co¤ee in two sizes. Alternatively, the premium product is of higher
quality than the basic product (such as a car with a better engine), or includes an add-
onproduct alongside the basic product (such as an enhanced warranty to go with a new
television).
Consider the following discrete choice framework. A consumer is willing to pay v1 for
the basic product and an extra amount v2 for the premium product relative to the basic
product. The seller charges price p1 for the basic product and a total price p1 + p2 for the
premium product, so that p2 is the incremental price for the upgrade.2 Likewise, let c1 be
the sellers cost of supplying the basic product, and c2 be its incremental cost of supplying
an upgrade (so its total cost for the premium product is c1 + c2). This perspective where
a premium product is viewed as a basic product bundled with an upgrade, and where the
price of this product is the sum of the basic price and the price for the upgrade is known
as the upgradesapproach to product line pricing.3
The type-(v1; v2) consumer buys the premium product if her surplus from doing so,
v1 + v2   (p1 + p2), is above her surplus from the basic product, v1   p1 and from not
buying anything (which is zero). She buys the basic product if the corresponding pair
of inequalities is satised. The three cases partition the set of consumer types as shown
2Thus, here I assume the seller uses a deterministic strategy. See section 3.1 for a discussion of the
protability of stochastic schemes.
3The approach is presented in Johnson and Myatt (2003, 2006b). An early treatment of the issue,
which implicitly uses the upgrades approach, is Itoh (1983).
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in Figure 1. Note that a consumer with v1 < p1 who buys the premium product gains
negative surplus from the basic product, and only buys that product as a means with which
to obtain the valued premium product. Write Q1(p1; p2) for the fraction of consumers who
buy something either the basic or the premium product when the tari¤is (p1; p2), and let
Q2(p1; p2) be the fraction who buy the premium product. In smooth cases we have Slutsky
symmetry of demand functions, so that @Q1=@p2  @Q2=@p1  0. (Roughly speaking, this
negative cross-price e¤ect is equal to the measure of consumers on the diagonal line on
Figure 1.) When these cross-price e¤ects are negative the basic product and the upgrade
are complementary products. The sellers prot with tari¤ (p1; p2) is
 = (p1   c1)Q1(p1; p2) + (p2   c2)Q2(p1; p2) : (1)
For instance, suppose that (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on the unit square [0; 1]2 and
c1 = c2 = 0. Then by calculating the areas of the regions on Figure 1 one nds that the
most protable tari¤ is (p1; p2) = (23 ;
1
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Figure 1: Pattern of demand with tari¤ (p1; p2)
For i = 1; 2 write Ni(pi)  Prfvi  pig. Thus, N1(p1) is the fraction of consumers
willing to pay p1 for the basic product in isolation, while N2(p2) is the fraction who would
pay p2 for the upgrade given they have the basic product. From Figure 1 we see that
N1(p1)  Q1(p1; p2) and N2(p2)  Q2(p1; p2). In the context of nonlinear pricing, Wilson
(1993) refers to the demand functions fN1(); N2()g as the demand prole, and I will
also use that term in the more general context of upgrades and add-ons.
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It would be useful if the seller could calculate its optimal tari¤ merely from knowing
its demand prole fN1(p1); N2(p2)g instead of the unwieldy and hard-to-estimate demand
functions fQ1(p1; p2); Q2(p1; p2)g. That is, when can the seller treat consumer demand for
the basic product and for the upgrade as separate, rather than complementary, markets?
To understand this, suppose that the distribution of tastes is such that no consumers
have taste vectors (v1; v2) to the north-west of the price vector (p1; p2) on Figure 1.
This implies that all consumers buy as if they were myopic: they buy the basic product
whenever v1  p1 and go on to buy the upgrade if v2  p2. In this situation we have
Ni(pi) = Qi(p1; p2), there are no cross-price e¤ects in consumer demand for the basic
product and the upgrade, and the two products can (locally) be considered as separate
markets. Therefore, if the tari¤ which maximizes the notional demand proleprot
 = (p1   c1)N1(p1) + (p2   c2)N2(p2) : (2)
is such that all consumers purchase myopically i.e., v2  p2 implies v1  p1 this tari¤
satises the rst-order conditions for maximizing true prot (1).
The optimal tari¤ in the previous uniform squareexample cannot be derived using
this demand prole method. (There, the prices which maximize (2) are p1 = p2 = 12 ,
and faced with this tari¤ some consumers would choose to buy the premium product even
though v1 < p1.) Other distributions for consumer tastes work well with the approach,
however. For example, many studies of second-degree price discrimination assume there is
scalar consumer heterogeneity, in the sense that v2  kv1 and valuation vectors on Figure
1 all lie on a ray of slope k from the origin.4 Following Johnson and Myatt (2003), suppose
that the CDF for v1 is F (v1), which we assume to have an increasing hazard rate so that
the prot functions in (2) are single-peaked. The demand prole approach chooses p1 to
maximize (p1   c1)(1  F (p1)) and p2 to maximize (p2   c2)(1  F (p2=k)). If c2  kc1, so
that cost of supply rises proportionately more steeply than consumer utility (i.e., there are
decreasing returnsto quality in the sense of Johnson and Myatt, 2003), this procedure
implies that p2  kp1. This in turn implies that all consumers purchase myopically and the
method yields the optimal tari¤. By contrast, if there are increasing returns to supplying
4These preferences are sometimes referred to as Mussa-Rosen preferences, after Mussa and Rosen
(1978) who studied a model where a consumers valuation for incremental units was proportional to her
value for the rst unit. Such preferences apply if consumers di¤er not in their intrinsic preferences but only
in their income, and being richer just shifts a consumers valuation vector equiproportionately. Similar
analysis applies if the valuation vectors lie on a monotonically increasing curve, rather than a ray, as
discussed more systematically in the next section.
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quality, so that c2 < kc1, it is optimal to supply only the premium product to consumers.
(The demand prole method does not always work in this case.)
Whenever the demand prole approach can be used, the second-degree pricing problem
coincides with the more straightforward theory of single-product monopoly pricing, and
the optimal tari¤ is determined by standard demand elasticities. The Lerner index for
the basic product, (p1   c1)=p1, is equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand for
the basic product, N1(), while the Lerner index for the upgrade is equal to the reciprocal
of the elasticity of its demand, N2(). It also follows that the upgrade price, p2, is above
its cost, c2.5 This implies that the seller obtains more prot when it supplies a premium
product than a basic product. However, the proportional markup is lower for the premium
product when (p1 + p2)=(c1 + c2) < p1=c1, i.e., when p2=c2 < p1=c1, which is often the case.
(For instance, this is true in the previous Mussa-Rosen example with c2 > kc1, and also
in the next model with continuous choices we see that the optimal nonlinear tari¤ is often
concave in quantity.)
An important question in the context of product lines is when it is optimal for the
seller to supply just a single product or a menu of price/quality options.6 Deneckere and
McAfee (1996) provide analysis and several instances of damaged goods, where the rm
deliberately introduces an inferior variant of its product (such as slower computer chip),
which might even cost more than its standard product. (Having the inferior version cost
more corresponds to c2 < 0 in the current notation.) As discussed, this situation cannot
occur with Mussa-Rosenpreferences. More generally, though, it is straightforward to
nd situations where it is protable for the rm to introduce an inferior, but more costly,
product variant. For instance, the uniform square example above had c2 = 0 and at
the optimum some consumers were induced to purchase the inferior option; by continuity
it would still be protable to do so even if c2 was slightly negative. Here, it is more
protable to o¤er a basic product alongside a less costly premium product in order to price
discriminate more nely between consumers.
Nonlinear pricing: Further issues arise in the more specic context of nonlinear pricing.
Suppose that the seller incurs the constant unit cost c to supply a unit of its product to
5This is not necessarily the case more generally, when, as discussed, Q1 and Q2 exhibit negative cross-
price e¤ects. As is well-understood, it is sometimes optimal for a seller which supplies complementary
products to set the price for one product below cost to stimulate demand for the other.
6For further discussion of this point, see Myatt and Johnson (2003, section III.B) and Anderson and
Dana (2009).
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a consumer. A consumer is willing to pay v1 for a single unit the product and v2 for a
second unit. It is natural to assume diminishing returns, so that v2  v1 for all consumers.
(By contrast, in the more general formulation, a buyer might put little value on the basic
product but a lot on the premium variant.) The seller charges price p1 for the rst unit
and incremental price p2 for the second unit, and o¤ers a quantity discount when p2 < p1.7
Given there are diminishing returns, the demand prole, Ni(p) = Prfvi  pg, coincides
with demand with the linear tari¤ p1 = p2 = p, which is Qi(p; p). Even when the demand
prole approach cannot be used to generate the optimal nonlinear tari¤, the demand prole
can always be used to determine when it is protable for the seller to o¤er a quantity
discount. To see this, let p^ be the most protable linear price, i.e., which maximizes
(p   c)(N1(p) + N2(p)). From (1), the impact on the sellers prot when it introduces a
small discount for buying the second unit is
 

(p^  c)

@Q1
@p2
+
@Q2
@p2

 Q2

p1=p2=p^
=  

(p^  c)

@Q2
@p1
+
@Q2
@p2

 Q2

p1=p2=p^
=  (p^  c)N 02(p^) N2(p^)
=
N1(p^) +N2(p^)
N 01(p^) +N
0
2(p^)
N 02(p^) N2(p^) : (3)
Here, the rst equality follows from Slutsky symmetry and the nal equality follows from
the rst-order condition for p^ to be the optimal linear price. Expression (3) is positive
when N2(p)=N1(p) strictly decreases with p at p = p^; that is, when N2 is more elastic than
N1. Therefore, the seller obtains greater prot by using a quantity discount than with
linear pricing whenever its average demand per consumer decreases with its linear price,
i.e., if participation is less elastic than usage with respect to changes in linear price.8 The
seller can determine whether a quantity discount will boost its prot with knowledge only
of its demand at linear prices. (However, it does need to know its average demand per
consumer, not merely aggregate demand N1 +N2.)
To illustrate the nonlinear pricing problem with an example, suppose that (v1; v2) is
uniformly distributed with density 2 on the triangle f(v1; v2) such that 0  v2  v1  1g.
Then N1(p) = 1   p2 and N2(p) = (1   p)2, so that N2=N1 = (1   p)=(1 + p) decreases
with p and a quantity discount is protable. With costless production, the most protable
7This discrete choice formulation of the nonlinear pricing problem is mentioned in Adams and Yellen
(1976, pp. 488-489) and in Wilson (1993, section 4.3).
8This is an instance of the more general insight that a two-part tari¤ with a positive xed charge is
more protable than linear pricing when usage is more elastic than participation. For instance, see Long
(1984).
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linear price maximizes p(N1(p)+N2(p)), so that p^ = 12 . With this linear tari¤, one-third of
the consumers who buy something buy both units. By calculating the areas of the regions
on Figure 1, one can check that the nonlinear tari¤ which maximizes (1) is
p1 =
2
3
and p2 = 23   13
p
2  0:2 : (4)
Now about 80% of consumers who buy something buy both units, while total output is
about 20% greater than with the linear tari¤. This boost in output is enough to make total
welfare higher with nonlinear than linear pricing, although those consumers who place little
value on a second unit are worse o¤ since the price they pay rises.
As usual, the calculation of the optimal nonlinear tari¤ is simplied when the demand
prole approach is valid, so that p1 maximizes (p  c)N1(p) and p2 maximizes (p  c)N2(p).
In this case, the (second-degree) nonlinear pricing problem becomes an instance of third-
degree price discrimination. For instance, if the demand prole fN1; N2g happened to
consist of linear demand functions, it is well known that price discrimination causes total
output to remain unchanged, so that total welfare falls. The exception to this is when
price discrimination enables a market to open up, in which case a Pareto improvement
results.9
Behavioural aspects of nonlinear pricing: One of the most active areas of current research
in nonlinear pricing concerns the exploitation of consumer biases. For instance, consider
a setting in which consumers are initially over-optimistic about their eventual demand for
the sellers product. Specically, consumers are identical ex ante, and a consumer will
want either one or two units of the product where the value of each unit (if a consumer
wants that unit) is common knowledge and denoted v.10 The cost of supplying a unit is
c < v. The consumers prior probability that she will want two units is denoted , while
the sellers prior probability that the consumer will want two units is  < . The seller
o¤ers a contract whereby p1 is the price for the rst unit and p2 is the price for the second
(if desired) given the consumer has purchased the rst, and requires the consumer to accept
9Following Varian (1985), welfare can only increase with nonlinear pricing relative to linear pricing if
total output Q1 + Q2 rises. Suppose that v2 = kv1 for k  1, c = 0 and v1 is uniformly distributed on
[0; 1]. Then the optimal nonlinear tari¤ is p1 = 12 and p2 =
1
2k. If k  13 then with linear pricing it is more
protable to serve only the one-unit demand, and to set p1 = p2 = 12 . A move to nonlinear pricing then
opens up the market for two units, resulting in a Pareto improvement.
10The following discussion is essentially taken from the illustrative example in Eliaz and Spiegler (2008,
section 1). They go on to analyze a more general model in which consumers di¤er in their prior of whether
they will have high or low demand (while the seller believes that all consumers have the same probability
of having high demand).
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the contract before the latter knows whether she wants one or two units. (This is a stylized
representation of a gym contract, say, where the consumer signs a contract which species
a monthly fee and/or a per-visit charge.)
Since the seller will choose p2  v to ensure the consumer buys the second unit if she
wants it, the consumers anticipated surplus with (p1; p2) is
v   p1 + (v   p2) ; (5)
while the sellers anticipated prot is
p1   c+ (p2   c) : (6)
The seller will maximize (6) subject to (5) being non-negative, which entails
p1 = (1 + )v ; p2 = 0 : (7)
(Here, we assumed p2 < 0 was not feasible, since otherwise a consumer would take the
second unit even if she did not want it.) Thus, an optimistic consumer is o¤ered an all
you can eatcontract where she pays a xed fee for the right to any quantity which she
(mistakenly, from the sellers perspective) believes to be good value. If the sellers prior
is correct, it obtains more prot with nonlinear pricing than with linear pricing, while
the consumer su¤ers negative surplus on average. This kind of model is consistent with
empirical data in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) showing that consumers often sign
up for monthly fee contracts with exercise gyms, even though ex post they would be better
o¤ paying per visit.
Another behavioural bias is over-condence about future demand, in the sense that a
consumers prediction of her eventual demand is too precise and she does not adequately
take into account the possibility she will need fewer or more units. The seller can exploit
this bias by charging high prices when the consumers demand di¤ers from her prediction.
To illustrate this, suppose the consumer might want 0, 1 or 2 units, and again her value for
a unit, if she wants it, is v and the sellers cost is c < v.11 Ex ante, the consumer believes
she will want one unit for sure, while the seller has a more di¤use prior and believes the
consumer will want 0, 1 or 2 units with equal probability. The seller o¤ers a contract
11This example is taken from Grubb (2009, section II). Grubb goes on to solve a more general formulation
of this problem and also studies the model with competition.
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(p0; p1; p2), where p0 is the up-front fee the consumer must pay for the right to purchase
one unit for price p1 and a second unit for additional price p2.
The consumers anticipated surplus if she accepts the contract (p0; p1; p2) is
v   (p0 + p1) ; (8)
while the sellers anticipated prot is
p0 +
2
3
(p1   c) + 13(p2   c) : (9)
Maximizing (9) subject to (8) being non-negative, as well as the constraint p2  v which
ensures the consumer buys the second unit if she wants it, implies that the most protable
contract is
p0 = v ; p2 = 0 ; p3 = v : (10)
Thus, the consumer is asked to pay for one unit in advance, is given no rebate if she ends up
not needing this unit, and pays her reservation value if she ends up wanting a second unit.12
Again, if its prior is accurate, the seller obtains greater prot with this nonlinear tari¤ than
with the best linear contract, while the consumer su¤ers negative surplus on average. Tari¤
(10) is an example of a so-called three-parttari¤, as often used in telephony or car rentals,
where the consumer pays a xed charge for a specied quantity (or less), and pays a steep
overage charge when she goes beyond her contracted limit. In a three-part tari¤, the
highest-demand consumer pays the highest marginal price, which is the opposite pattern
to the standard nonlinear pricing model where quantity discounts are the norm.
Additional issues arise when consumers su¤er from weak will, and at the time of actual
consumption their preferences di¤er from those at the time they choose their contract.
For instance, a (sophisticated) person keen to become physically t may foresee that when
the time comes she will be unwilling to go to the gym, and so choose a xed-fee gym
contract with zero marginal price so that nancial disincentives do not add to her self-
control problem. A (naive) person who is initially unaware that she has weak will will
behave in a similar manner to an overoptimistic consumer above, in that they put too
much weight on the event they will have large demand. Opposite e¤ects apply when a
consumer is tempted to purchase too much of a bad product: a sophisticated shopper who
12The extreme assumption that the consumer foresees no uncertainty in her demand is not important
here, and the some outcome is optimal whenever the consumers prior is such that the probabilities she
needs no unit and needs two units are both below one-third.
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is aware of his temptation to over-spend, say, may opt for a bank account which levies
steep overdraft charges.13
Finally, it may be that o¤ering a second unit at discount makes the deal look like a
bargain, which stimulates demand by more than the model with rational buyers suggests.
Jahedi (2011) conducts lab experiments in which a seller o¤ers two units for little more
than the price for a single unit, and shows how some consumers are less likely to buy two
units when faced with the choice set {buy nothing, buy two units for $1} than they are
with the expanded choice set {buy nothing, buy one unit for $0.96, buy two units for $1}.
2.2 Nonlinear pricing with continuous choices
In contrast to the discussion in section 2.1, most textbook treatments of nonlinear pricing
treat quantity as a continuous variable and suppose that consumer tastes vary just by
a scalar parameter, . To recapitulate this classical analysis, which will be useful later,
suppose that the type- consumer gains gross utility u(q; ) from q units of the product.
(This discussion can be adapted so that q represents product quality instead of quantity.)
There is diminishing marginal utility, so u is concave in q, and u(0; )  0. We suppose
that u increases with , and also that there are increasing di¤erences in u(q; ), so that
uq(q; ) increases with , where uq denotes the partial derivative of u. Since uq(q; ) is the
linear price which induces the type- consumer to purchase q units of the product i.e., it
is this consumers inverse demand curve this assumption implies that demand functions
from two di¤erent consumers do not cross.14
If the seller o¤ers the nonlinear tari¤ T (q), the type- consumer will choose quantity
q() which maximizes her surplus u(q; )  T (q) and so obtain maximum surplus
s()  max
q0
: u(q; )  T (q) : (11)
Regardless of the shape of T (), consumers with higher  will choose a weakly greater
quantity. (And conversely, any weakly increasing function q() can be implemented by a
suitable nonlinear tari¤.) The taste parameter  is distributed in the consumer population
13A key early paper in this literature is DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). See Spiegler (2011, chapters
24) for an overview of contract design with dynamically inconsistent consumers, and Koszegi (2015) for
a survey of contract design in the presence of biased agents.
14Prominent early contributions to this classical analysis include Spence (1977), Mussa and Rosen (1978),
Goldman, Leland, and Sibley (1984) and Maskin and Riley (1984). The important trick of using the
envelope condition and integration by parts (see expression (13) below) is due to Mirrlees (1971). A useful
overview of this analysis is presented in Rochet and Stole (2003, section 2).
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according to the smooth CDF F (), which has support [1; 2] and associated density
f() = F 0(). To maximize its prot, the seller will leave the lowest type consumer with
zero surplus, i.e., s(1) = 0, since otherwise it could increase its tari¤ T by an additive
constant without driving any consumers away. Since s() weakly increases with  in (11),
if the lowest-type consumer is willing to participate so are all consumers. If the sellers
unit cost is c, its prot with tari¤ T isZ 2
1
[T (q())  cq()] f()d =
Z 2
1
[u(q(); )  s()  cq()] f()d (12)
=
Z 2
1

u(q(); )  1  F ()
f()
u(q(); )  cq()

f()d ; (13)
where the second equality follows by integrating
R
sfd by parts and using the envelope
condition s0()  u(q(); ) together with the participation constraint s(1) = 0.
The candidate solution to the sellers prot is to maximize the integral (13) pointwise
with respect to q(), so that
q() maximizesq0 : u(q; )  1  F ()
f()
u(q; )  cq (14)
for each . Provided the procedure (14) results in a weakly increasing function q(), which
is so if (14) has increasing di¤erences in (q; ), it yields the sellers most protable strategy.
If the seller could observe a consumers type directly, it would o¤er the type- consumer
a quantity which maximizes total surplus u(q; )   cq. When  is private information,
though, (14) implies that the type- consumer is supplied with a lower quantity than the
rst-best quantity. The exception is for the consumer with the strongest tastes (if any such
consumer exists), and provided that (1  F ())=f()! 0 as  ! 2 the type-2 consumer
is served with the e¢ cient quantity and there is no distortion at the top.
Consider the Mussa-Rosenspecication u(q; ) = u(q), so that  shifts utility mul-
tiplicatively. In this case, q() in (14) is increasing if
   1  F ()
f()
increases with  : (15)
With costless production (c = 0), expression (14) implies that consumers are either served
with the maximum quantity (i.e., the quantity that maximizes u()) or nothing, so that
the seller o¤ers an all you can eatcontract. As seen in section 2.1, this is not necessarily
true outside this specication with scalar heterogeneity.
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Since the type- consumer chooses her quantity to maximize u(q)   T (q), the incre-
mental price of the qth unit, denoted p(q)  T 0(q), satises p(q()) = u0(q()). The
rst-order condition in (14) then implies that the Lerner index satises
p(q())  c
p(q())
=
1  F ()
f()
: (16)
If the right-hand side of (16) decreases with , which is a stronger condition than (15), we
deduce that marginal price decreases with quantity.15 Similarly, if the right-hand side of
(16) is constant, i.e., when  comes from a Pareto distribution, marginal price does not
depend on quantity and a simple two-part tari¤ is the sellers optimal nonlinear tari¤.
Since the marginal price satises p(q())  u0(q()), the type- consumers problem
of choosing quantity to maximize u(q)   T (q) is single-peaked in q.16 Thus a consumer
purchases myopically, and each infra-marginal unit generates positive surplus. As in section
2.1, since consumers purchase myopically we expect the demand prole approach to work.17
As in section 2.1, let Nq(p) denote the fraction of consumers who purchase at least q units
when faced with a linear price p. With the Mussa-Rosen specication, a consumer buys at
least q units with linear price p if u0(q)  p, and so
Nq(p) = 1  F

p
u0(q)

: (17)
The formula for the marginal price in (16) corresponds to the incremental price p(q) being
chosen for each q so that
p(q) maximizes (p  c)Nq(p) ; (18)
and the price for the qth unit simply maximizes the prot from selling this unit. Thus,
the shape of the nonlinear tari¤ is governed by how the elasticity of the demand function
Nq(p) varies with q.
The nonlinear pricing problem is especially neat when (15) is linear in , so that  (1 
F ())=f() = b a for constants a and b > 0.18 (A variety of familiar distributions fall into
this category, including the uniform, Pareto and exponential.) In this case, (18) implies
that bp(q) = c + au0(q). Provided that it is optimal for some consumers to be excluded,
15See Maskin and Riley (1984, Proposition 6).
16The derivative of this objective, evaluated at q(~), is u0(q(~))  p(q(~)) = (  ~)u0(q(~)). When q(~)
is increasing, this implies that u(q)  T (q) is increasing for q < q() and decreasing for q > q().
17For further discussion see Wilson (1993, sections 4.1 and 6.5) and Rochet and Choné (1998, section
2.3.1).
18See Itoh (1983), which is extended in Johnson and Myatt (2015) including to Cournot situations.
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this can be integrated to obtain the closed-form expression for the optimal nonlinear tari¤
T (q) = 1
b
(cq + au(q)). A curiosity of these cases is that this T (q) is the charge the seller
would levy if it only sold its product as a bundle of q units. If her sole option was to buy
q units at price T , the type- consumer would buy if u(q)  T , and so T is chosen to
maximize (1 F (T=u(q)))(T   cq), which is solved by choosing the above T (q). Thus, the
seller prices each bundle of units as if each bundle was a separate market, even though
there are actually cross-price e¤ects in consumer demand for the various bundles. In the
context of product line pricing, this implies that a seller can calculate its price for one
product variant (business class air travel, say) simply by supposing that that was the only
product it supplied.
Another situation where the solution is simple is the linear case where gross surplus for
the type- consumer is q and q is constrained to lie in the interval [0; 1]. This corresponds
to the situation where a risk-neutral consumer only wants a single indivisible unit of the
product, which she values at , and where the seller considers o¤ering its product stochas-
tically, so that a consumer can obtain the product with probability q in return for payment
T (q). Then (14) implies that the optimal strategy is to o¤er the product for sure in return
for the price p which maximizes (p   c)(1   F (p)). Thus, when the buyer is risk-neutral
and has unit demand, the seller has no incentive to o¤er its product stochastically, even
though such a strategy might enable it to screen between consumer types more nely.19
As discussed in section 3.1, this result is specic to the single-product context.
While the demand prole approach where the price for the qth unit is chosen to max-
imize prot in (18) works elegantly in this parameterized specication in which consumer
demand curves never cross, it applies to single-product situations far more widely. For
example, consumer heterogeneity might be multi-dimensional rather than scalar, in which
case we expect demand curves from di¤erent consumers sometimes to cross. (Demand
curves might be linear, say, but consumers di¤er both in the slope and the intercept of
demand.) Such problems can often be easily solved using the demand prole approach,
but are very di¢ cult to solve using a mechanism design approach which focusses on
preference parameters.20 This single-product analysis suggests that it is not so much the
19In fact this argument does not require that the hazard rate condition (15) be satised. See Myerson
(1981, section 6), Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) and Manelli and Vincent (2007) for more details.
20Wilson (1993, section 8.4) and Rochet and Stole (2003, section 5) solve examples where consumers
have linear demand with heterogeneous slopes and intercepts. Earlier, La¤ont, Maskin, and Rochet (1987)
solved such an example using a mechanism design approach, which was far more laborious. To illustrate,
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lack of a natural order on typesper se which makes solving nonlinear pricing problems
hard. Rather, as discussed in the introduction, with multiple products there is a lack of a
natural in decisions, and this makes it hard to derive tari¤s except in specic cases (as in
section 3.2).
Nonlinear pricing with an uncertain outside option: This analysis has so far assumed
consumers have a known outside option of zero if they do not purchase from the seller.
Here we discuss how the analysis is a¤ected if consumers are heterogeneous in their outside
option. This analysis provides a bridge between the situations with a single seller and with
oligopoly supply in section 4.1: in a market with several sellers where consumers are one-
stop shoppers, a consumers outside option if she does not accept one sellers o¤er could
be an o¤er from a rival seller.
Outside options can make the sellers problem more complicated, due to the two-
dimensional nature of consumer heterogeneity combined with the fact that the demand
prole approach is unlikely to work well. (With an attractive outside option, a consumer
will only obtain a benet from buying from the seller after some threshold quantity is
purchased, and so they do not purchase myopically.) Consider the following framework
studied by Rochet and Stole (2002).21 As above, with nonlinear tari¤ T (q) the consumer
obtains maximum surplus s() = maxq u(q; )  T (q) if she buys from the seller. However,
the consumer has an uncertain outside option, say x  0, if she does not buy from the
seller, where the conditional CDF for x given the consumers type  is G(x; ). Thus, the
type-(; x) consumer will buy from the seller if x  s(), and the sellers prot is modied
from expression (12) toZ 2
1
G(s(); ) [u(q(); )  s()  cq()] f()d : (19)
Here, the seller operates on an extensive margin for all consumer types, and if it o¤ers
higher surplus s() it attracts more type- consumers to buy from it. The extra term
G(s(); ) in (19) means we can no longer use the trick of integrating by parts to eliminate
suppose that the type-(1; 2) consumer has linear demand function q = 1 2p, where (1; 2) is uniformly
distributed on [0; 1]  [1; 2]. (We bound 2 away from zero so that total surplus is bounded.) One can
then calculate Nq(p), the fraction of consumers who buy at least q units with linear price p. With
costless production one can check that the price which maximizes prots from the qth unit, pNq(p), is
p(q) = 13 (1  q), and the corresponding nonlinear tari¤ is T (q) = 13q  16q2. One can also check that every
consumer has su¢ ciently concave utility that they buy myopically when faced with this tari¤.
21See also Yang and Ye (2008).
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s() as we did in expression (13), and instead one must often resort to using optimal control
methods or similar.
On the other hand, outside options can also simplify the sellers problem when, as is
plausible, a consumers outside option is positively correlated with her tastes for the sellers
product. For instance, a consumer with a strong taste for the sellers product may have
a strong taste for a rivals product too. In these situations, countervailing incentives
may mean that the seller is unable to exploit consumers even if it knew they had strong
preferences for its product.22 Countervailing incentives sometimes entail particularly simple
schemes being optimal, and in the context of nonlinear pricing it may be that the seller
sets price equal to marginal cost regardless of the quantity purchased.
To illustrate, write S() = maxq u(q; )   cq to be the surplus generated for a type-
consumer with marginal-cost pricing, and suppose the outside option for a type- consumer
takes the form x = S()+, where  is an additive shock to S() which is independent of .
(While this seems a very particular specication with monopoly supply, it naturally emerges
in the context of duopoly in section 4.1.) I assume that x = S() +  is the consumers sole
outside option even if this is negative. Suppose, hypothetically, the seller can observe a
consumers parameter  (but not her ). The most protable way to deliver a given surplus
to this consumer is to charge marginal price equal to marginal cost, and then extract the
desired prot via a xed charge, say P . Doing so means that the consumer will buy from
the seller if S() P  x = S() + , and the seller therefore chooses the xed charge P to
maximize P Prf   Pg. Since  is independent of , the optimal xed charge does not
depend on , and this is the optimal scheme even if the seller cannot observe . Therefore,
the most protable nonlinear tari¤ is a two-part tari¤ with price equal to marginal cost,
and countervailing incentives imply that the seller cannot protably screen consumers on
the basis of their tastes for its product. Broadly speaking, the independence of  and 
implies that the sellers demand from infra-marginal buyers is the same as its demand from
marginal buyers, and in these cases we expect e¢ cient outcomes to be chosen.23
22See Lewis and Sappington (1989) for an early exploration of this issue in the context of monopoly
regulation, where a regulated rm with a high marginal cost is known to have a low xed cost.
23Spence (1975) makes this point in the context of quality choice.
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3 Single-Seller, Multi-Product Analysis
3.1 A framework with discrete choices
Consider a monopolist which supplies two products, labeled 1 and 2, where a consumer buys
either zero or one unit of each product (and maybe a unit of each). A consumer is willing to
pay vi for product i = 1; 2 on its own, and to pay vb for the bundle of both products. Thus
a consumers preferences are described by the vector (v1; v2; vb). A consumers valuations
are additive if vb = v1 + v2, while she views the two products as partial substitutes when
vb < v1 + v2 and as partial complements if vb > v1 + v2. The great majority of the articles
written on bundling as a form of price discrimination assume valuations are additive, as
much for tractability as for realism.
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Figure 2: Pattern of demand with additive valuations and tari¤ (p1; p2; )
Consumers face three prices: p1 is the price for product 1 on its own, p2 is the price for
product 2 on its own, and p1 + p2    is the price for the bundle of both products. Thus,
 is the bundle discount, which is zero with linear pricing. A consumer chooses the option
from the four discrete choices which leaves her with the highest net surplus, so she will buy
both items whenever vb   (p1 + p2   )  maxfv1   p1; v2   p2; 0g, she will buy product
i = 1; 2 on its own whenever vi   pi  maxfvb   (p1 + p2   ); vj   pj; 0g, and otherwise
she buys neither product. Figure 2 shows the pattern of demand in the case of additive
valuations (vb  v1 + v2) with a positive bundle discount.
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As functions of the tari¤ parameters (p1; p2; ), denote by Qi the proportion of con-
sumers who buy product i = 1; 2 (either on its own or as part of the bundle), and denote by
Qb the proportion who buy both products. As can be checked from Figure 2 in the special
case with additive valuations, in general we have Slutsky symmetry of cross-price e¤ects, so
that @Qi=@   @Qb=@pi for i = 1; 2. As before, it is useful to dene the demand functions
that correspond to linear pricing (i.e., with  = 0), and let Ni(p1; p2)  Qi(p1; p2; 0) and
Nb(p1; p2)  Qb(p1; p2; 0). As one would expect, the sign of cross-price e¤ects with linear
pricing depends on product substitutability or complementarity: if vb  v1 + v2 (respec-
tively, vb  v1 + v2) for all consumers, then Ni weakly increases (respectively, decreases)
with the other products price pj. Importantly, though, when products are substitutes
and a bundle discount is o¤ered, the cross-price e¤ect can be reversed.24 That is to say, a
bundle discount can convert products which intrinsically are substitutes into complements.
This insight implies that separate sellers sometimes can relax competition by agreeing to
o¤er a coordinated bundle discount, as discussed in section 4.2.
The sellers incentive to introduce a bundle discount can be analyzed in a similar manner
to the approach in section 2.1.25 If the constant marginal cost of supplying product i = 1; 2
is ci, the sellers prot with tari¤ (p1; p2; ) is
 = (p1   c1)Q1 + (p2   c2)Q2   Qb : (20)
One can calculate the most protable linear prices, denoted (p^1; p^2) say, and then derive
the impact on prot (20) of introducing a small bundle discount  > 0. Doing so reveals
that o¤ering a discount is protable when demand for a product is less elastic than demand
for the bundle, in the sense that
d
dt
Nb(p^1 + t[p^1   c1]; p^2 + t[p^2   c2])
Ni(p^1 + t[p^1   c1]; p^2 + t[p^2   c2])

t=0
< 0 ; (21)
so that a small amplication in price/cost markups causes demand for the bundle to
fall proportionally more than demand for an individual product. (If this inequality holds
for one product i it holds for the other.) As with nonlinear pricing, then, to determine
whether bundling is protable the seller needs knowledge only of its demand system with
linear prices.
24From Figure 2, which involves additive valuations, when  > 0 an increase in p1 reduces the demand
for product 2.
25For details see Long (1984) and Armstrong (2013).
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Consider the case where consumer valuations are additive, i.e., vb  v1 + v2, in which
case N1 is a function only of p1 and N2 only depends on p2. Moreover, if v1 and v2 are
stochastically independent, bundle demand with linear prices is just Nb  N1  N2, and
the left-hand side of (21) has the same sign as N 0j(p^j), which is negative. Thus we obtain
the striking result that when products are doubly independent that is, valuations are
additive and stochastically independent it is protable for the seller to o¤er a bundle
discount.26
To illustrate, suppose that c1 = c2 = 0, valuations are additive, and (v1; v2) is uniformly
distributed on the unit square [0; 1]2. Due to the symmetry of the two products, the seller
o¤ers the same price for either product on its own. This example is essentially the same as
the triangleexample presented in section 2.1 where the most protable nonlinear tari¤
was (4), and the sellers most protable bundling tari¤ is to charge a price 2
3
for either
single product and the incremental price 2
3
  1
3
p
2 for the second item, so that the bundle
discount is  =
p
2=3  0:47.27 For comparison, the most protable linear prices are
p1 = p2 =
1
2
, and so the use of bundling causes the price for a single product to rise, but
the price for the bundle to fall.
When valuations are additive, the revenue from selling two products using a bundling
tari¤ is more than the sum of selling the two products separately with linear prices. Thus,
even with products with no cross-e¤ects in demand, there is an incentive for two sellers,
each supplying one product, to merge, if that means that bundling can be employed. This
demand-side economy of scope is the force behind the nding in Bakos and Brynjolfsson
(2000) that a content provider with an existing wide portfolio of content is willing to bid
more for new content than a smaller content provider.
Beyond the doubly independent case, it is somewhat intuitive that, all else equal,
negative correlation in (additive) valuations makes it more likely that bundling is protable.
Negative correlation puts less weight in the north-eastpart of the distribution on Figure
26Long (1984) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) independently derived this result.
Menicucci, Hurkens, and Jeon (2014) show that with stochastically independent valuations, the seller
wishes to o¤er the two products as a pure bundle, rather than to use a mixed bundling tari¤, when virtual
valuations exceed cost for each product.
27Manelli and Vincent (2006, Theorem 5) show that the optimal tari¤ in the corresponding example
with three products has price 0.75 for any one product, price 1.14 for any two products, and price 1.22 for
all three products. Unfortunately, in Armstrong (2010, section III.A) I tried to solve the same example
(in ignorance of the earlier paper) and did so incorrectly.
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2, which tends to make bundle demand Nb more elastic.28 Likewise, making products
more substitutable also reduces the scale of bundle demand, which will often increase its
elasticity.29 Subadditive preferences give a direct reason, in addition to screening motives,
to engage in bundling. For example if the seller with costless production knows a consumers
valuation vector is (v1; v2; vb) = (2; 2; 3), it cannot extract the maximum surplus of 3 with
linear pricing but can with a bundling tari¤.
The early literature on bundling, such as Stigler (1963) and Adams and Yellen (1976),
often emphasized the case where valuations were additive and very negatively correlated.
If taste vectors lay on the diagonal line segment v1+v2  1, say, and production is costless,
the seller can extract all consumer surplus by making only the bundle available (for total
price 1), while if it used linear pricing consumers would be left with positive surplus but
prot and total welfare would be lower. In such cases, the seller accurately knows each
consumers value for the bundle, but not for either product individually. (One then has
the counter-intuitive result that consumers can be made worse o¤ when a second product
is introduced, since that allows the seller to fully extract their surplus.)
A similar e¤ect can be seen when consumer valuations are independent across prod-
ucts, arguably a more natural situation, when the number of products is relatively large.
(Examples where buyers have demand for many products include online retailing of music
or e-books, publishers which supply a large collection of academic journals, or software
companies which sell site licenses to institutions with many users.) To illustrate, suppose
there are n symmetric products, each with marginal cost of supply c. Valuations are addi-
tive, and each consumers valuation for each product i, vi, is an independent draw from a
common distribution with CDF G(), say. Faced with a particular consumer whose list of
valuations is (v1; :::; vn), the sellers ideal strategy is to supply this consumer with product
i if vi  c and to extract the consumers total valuation from all such products. This can
be done by o¤ering the consumer a two-part tari¤ whereby where she can purchase any
product for price p = c by paying a xed charge P equal to her resulting surplus, which is
P =
nX
i=1
maxfvi   c; 0g : (22)
28Chen and Riordan (2013) explore with copula techniques how changing the correlation in valuations,
while keeping marginal distributions unchanged, a¤ects the protability of bundling. They nd that
introducing a bundle discount is usually protable with negative correlation, and also with moderate
positive correlation.
29See the discussion in Armstrong (2013, pages 457-8).
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The problem with this strategy is that this xed charge P depends on the consumers
valuations, which are not observed by the seller. However, P in (22) is the independent
sum of the random variables maxfvi   c; 0g. If we write  for the expected value of
maxfvi   c; 0g, the weak law of large numbers tells us that the fraction of consumers for
whom 1
n
P   ", where " > 0, converges to one as the number of products becomes large.
That is, even though the seller does not know a consumers valuation for any individual
product, it can accurately estimate her total surplus from the ability to purchase every
product at cost.
We deduce that the seller can approximately obtain its rst-best prot by o¤ering a
two-part tari¤ with price equal to cost and xed charge a little lower than the average
consumer surplus generated with this price. Such a tari¤ is approximately e¢ cient it
allows almost all consumers to participate and when a consumer participates she buys a
product whenever her valuation is above cost but almost fully extracts each consumers
surplus. (By contrast, with linear pricing the seller o¤ers a price strictly above cost, which
ine¢ ciently excludes consumers from some products, but allows consumers to retain some
gains from trade.) When c = 0, as with information goods such as music downloads or
electronic journals, the seller simply o¤ers the grand bundle of all products in return for a
xed charge.30
This analysis assumes that consumers exhibit no systematic di¤erences, only idiosyn-
cratic product preferences, which is clearly too strong to be plausible in most situations.
(Some consumers like music more than others, for instance.) Suppose instead that con-
sumers di¤er systematically in their overall taste for the set of products, captured by the
scalar parameter  which is distributed in the population according to CDF F (). The
type- consumers valuation for each product, vi, is now an independent draw from the
CDF G(v; ), which has associated density g(v; ). Suppose that G(v; ) decreases with ,
so that higher- consumers tend to have higher valuations for each product.
With many products, the sample CDF of a type- consumers list of valuations that
is, the fraction of her products with valuation below v is approximated by the under-
lying distribution, G(v; ). Since products are symmetric, suppose the seller chooses a
tari¤ which depends only on the number of products purchased. Since there are many
30See Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) for details of this analysis. Geng, Stinch-
combe, and Whinston (2005) focus on the situation where products have very asymmetric distributions,
in the sense that the distribution for valuation vi becomes concentrated at zero as i becomes large. They
show that pure bundling is optimal provided that the distributions do not converge to zero too fast.
22
products, normalize their number to 1 and let q denote the fraction of available products
purchased and T (q) denote the sellers charge for purchasing any such bundle. If we take
the type- consumers sample CDF of valuations to be exactly G(v; ), her gross utility
from consuming the highest-value fraction q of products is
u(q; ) =
Z 1
V (q;)
vg(v; )dv ; (23)
where V (q; ) is the type- consumers value such that 1 G(V (q; ); )  q. Then uq(q; ) =
V (q; ), which decreases with q and increases with  since 1   G(v; ) decreases with q
and increases with . Therefore, the utility function (23) satises the requirements for
the classical analysis of single-product nonlinear pricing presented in section 2.2, and the
sellers optimal strategy is given in expression (14).31 In particular, with information goods
(c = 0) only the grand bundle is o¤ered, but now the bundle price may exclude some
fraction of consumers. In sum, when consumers have unit demands for many products, an
approximately optimal bundling tari¤ can often be calculated using the standard approach
to single-product nonlinear pricing.
This discussion of situations with many products is an instance of an approach to price
discrimination which tries to approximate the optimal tari¤ by means of a simple tari¤,
or to gauge the loss incurred when simple tari¤s are used. For instance, Wilson (1993,
section 8.3) argues in the context of nonlinear pricing that the loss of prot involved in
using a nonlinear tari¤ consisting of N linear segments relative to the optimal tari¤ is
of order 1=N2. In the bundling context, Hart and Nisan (2014) show with two products
and consumer valuations which are identically and independently distributed, selling the
items separately (i.e., with a linear tari¤) can achieve at least 73% of the possible revenue
from any mechanism (including the stochastic schemes discussed shortly). Chu, Leslie, and
Sorensen (2011) examine the protability of bundle size pricing, whereby the price for a
bundle depends only on the number of items in the bundle. (With n products, bundle size
pricing involves n prices, while mixed bundling might involve 2n   1 prices.) They show
numerically that this simple tari¤ often obtains a large fraction of the maximum prots
obtained from mixed bundling. Using market data from a theatre company, they estimate
the joint distribution of valuations for the various shows. (They pin down correlations
in valuations by observing which shows appear together when consumers choose the any
31A version of this discussion was contained in Armstrong (1999, section 3).
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ve showsbundle o¤ered by the company.) They estimate in this case that bundle-size
pricing would obtain 98.5% of the prots which could be generated with mixed bundling.
Stochastic selling schemes: So far in this section I have only considered deterministic sell-
ing schemes. A multiproduct monopolist (or a single-product monopolist o¤ering di¤erent
quantities or qualities) can often increase its prot by using a stochastic scheme, in which
a consumer is uncertain about which bundle she will receive. To illustrate, consider the fol-
lowing example with three risk-neutral consumers each with additive valuations: consumer
1 has valuation pair (v1; v2) = (10; 1), consumer 2 has (v1; v2) = (1; 10), while consumer 3
has (v1; v2) = (9; 9). Here, consumer 3 has strong tastes for both products, while consumer
i = 1; 2 has slightly stronger tastes for product i but very weak tastes for the other product.
With costless production, the best deterministic selling strategy is to o¤er any single prod-
uct at price 10 and the bundle of both products at price 18, which makes each consumers
participation constraint bind (while incentive compatibility constraints are slack). How-
ever, the seller can extract more revenue by o¤ering consumer i = 1; 2 the deal whereby for
price 10 + " she obtains her preferred product for sure but also obtains her less preferred
product with probability ". This keeps these consumers to their participation constraint,
and if " is small enough (precisely, if " < 1
8
) then consumer 3 continues to su¤er negative
surplus if she chooses one of these stochastic contracts. This scheme therefore yields higher
prot for the seller, and does so by permitting small surplus-increasing changes which
do not interact with the slack incentive compatibility constraints.
Pavlov (2011, section 4) studies situations with additive valuations, and nds that
a stochastic scheme can be optimal even in the most regular cases where valuations
which are uniformly distributed on a square with lower boundary above zero. Manelli
and Vincent (2006) nd restrictive conditions under which a deterministic mechanism is
optimal. With two products and stochastically independent and additive valuations with
lower boundary of support equal to zero, a su¢ cient condition to rule out stochastic schemes
is that vif 0i(vi)=fi(vi) increases with vi where fi is the density for the valuation for product
i. Manelli and Vincent (2007) discuss the underlying reason why stochastic schemes can be
optimal with multiple products but not with one product. When consumers are risk-neutral
and have unit demands, the sellers problem is a linear function of the probability schedule,
and hence is maximized at the extreme pointsof the feasible set of such schedules. With
a single product, the extreme points simply correspond to selling the item for sure in return
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for a xed price. With several products, the extreme points can take make many forms,
including those which involve random assignment.
3.2 An example with continuous choices
In most cases where a seller employs nonlinear pricing or bundling, a consumer either pur-
chases multiple units of one product (as in section 2) or a single unit of several products
(section 3.1). Nevertheless, there are important situations in which consumers purchase
multiple units of several products. For instance, an energy company might supply elec-
tricity and gas, and o¤er a tari¤ which depends on the chosen quantities of both fuels.
Alternatively, the consumer might choose both the quality and the quantity of a product.
Unfortunately, the economics needed to understand multiproduct nonlinear tari¤s is not
yet well developed. In this section, I merely describe how the most protable such tari¤
can sometimes be derived, and in a relatively simple manner. Suppose the seller supplies
two symmetric products, each with marginal cost c, and suppose that the type-(w1; w2)
consumers demand for product i = 1; 2 with linear prices (p1; p2) is wix(pi). Thus, there
are no cross-price e¤ect in a consumers demands, x() is an underlying demand function,
and the taste parameter wi shifts her demand for product i multiplicatively. This demand
system corresponds to a gross utility function for the type-w consumer given by
w1U

q1
w1

+ w2U

q2
w2

; (24)
where U is the concave utility function corresponding to the demand function x(), i.e.,
U 0(x(p))  p.
It is useful to change variables so that
 = w1 + w2 ; r =
w1
w1 + w2
:
Here,  represents the average scale of the consumers demands and r represents her relative
taste for product 1 compared to product 2. A property of the utility specication (24) is
that the maximum utility which a consumer can obtain from total quantity q = q1 + q2
depends only on , not on r. More precisely, one can check that
max

w1U

q1
w1

+ w2U

q2
w2

subject to q1 + q2 = q

= U
q


; (25)
where the individual quantities which solve this problem are q1 = rq and q2 = (1  r)q.
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Suppose hypothetically that the seller can directly observe a consumers relative taste
parameter r, but not her scale parameter , and o¤ers this particular group of consumers
a nonlinear tari¤. Conditional on r, suppose the CDF for  is F (; r) with associated
density f(; r). Since the sellers cost depends only on total quantity, it will make the tari¤
to this group depend only on total quantity q, not on the individual quantities, qi, and let
the nonlinear tari¤ o¤ered to this group be T (q; !). The function u(q; )  U(q=) in
expression (25) has increasing di¤erences in (q; ), and we can therefore apply the method
described in section 2.2. Provided it results in an increasing total quantity schedule q(),
expression (14) reveals that the sellers optimal policy for this group of consumers is such
that the type- consumer in this group is allocated total quantity q() which maximizes
u(q; )  1  F (; r)
f(; r)
u(q; )  cq : (26)
Here, the type- consumer in this group obtains quantity q1 = rq() of product 1 and
q2 = (1   r)q() of product 2. If  and r are independent random variables, then the
conditional distribution F (; r) in (26) does not depend on r. In this case, the optimal tari¤
T () contingent on being able to observe r does not depend on r, and (26) represents the
optimal strategy even when the seller cannot observe r. In such cases, we have derived the
optimal multiproduct nonlinear tari¤, which depends only on the total quantity demanded
by the consumer.
Intuitively, when  and r are independent the consumer is happy for the seller to observe
her relative tastes r but not her average tastes . That is, for a given total quantity, the
consumer and seller have aligned preferences with respect to relative quantities. The seller
is willing to delegate to the consumer the choice of relative quantities, to enable her to make
use of her private information about relative tastes, and it does this by o¤ering a tari¤
which depends only on the total quantity supplied. However, if  and r were correlated,
observing the consumers choice of relative quantities is informative about the consumers
scale parameter , which gives a consumer an incentive to mis-report her parameter r as
well as her . I do not know how to solve any such cases analytically.32
To illustrate the method, suppose that w1 and w2 are independent exponential variables
with parameter . A property of i.i.d. exponential variables is that their sum and ratio
32One can instead study a discrete-types model. For instance, Armstrong and Rochet (1999) examine
a model with two products and where consumers can have strong or weak tastes for each product (so
there are four types of consumer in all). By considering the various ways in which the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints might bind, one can completely solve such a model.
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are also independent random variables, where   w1 +w2 is a Gamma variable with CDF
F () = 1  (1 + )e  and density f() = 2e  while r  w1=(w1 + w2) is uniformly
distributed on [0; 1]. Thus, the above method can be applied. To obtain an explicit solution,
suppose that production is costless,  = 1, and x(p) = 1  p, so that U(x) = x  1
2
x2 and
u(q; ) = q q2=(2). Then formula (26) implies that q() = 3=(1++2), which increases
with  as required. In terms of the original preference parameters (w1; w2), the optimal
allocation of product i = 1; 2 to the type-w consumer is
qi(w) = wi
(w1 + w2)
2
1 + (w1 + w2) + (w1 + w2)2
: (27)
The quantities the seller would allocate if it knew each consumers tastes perfectly are
qi = wi, and expression (27) shows that the seller allocates lower quantities than this when
tastes are private information (although the allocation is approximately e¢ cient when w
is large). Here, qi in (27) increases with wj, and even though utility is additive across
products and taste parameters w1 and w2 are stochastically independent i.e., preferences
are doubly independent it is optimal to induce bundling in this manner.
This analysis is loosely based on Armstrong (1996, section 4.4). However, the way
that taste parameters enter a consumers gross utility function in (24) di¤ers from the
specication in Armstrong (1996), and avoids the inevitability of exclusion whereby a
positive measure of consumers do not buy anything from the rm which was emphasized
in Armstrong (1996, section 3).33 Indeed, in (27) we see that all consumers buy something
in this optimal scheme. Rochet and Choné (1998, section 7.2) analyzed a related example
with taste parameters being exponentially distributed, but with the support shifted away
from the origin. However, taste parameters enter di¤erently into utility in their model:
in (24) the type-(w1; w2) consumer has gross utility u = q1 + q2   q21=(2w1)   q22=(2w2),
while their consumers have gross utility u = w1q1 + w1q2   q21=2   q22=2. Rochet and
Chonés example is solved numerically, and they nd that consumers with small (w1 +w2)
are excluded, consumers with intermediate (w1 + w2) are bunched in the sense that a
consumer in this region buys the same quantity of each product, while consumers with
large (w1 + w2) each buy a distinct bundle.
33The argument in Armstrong (1996) assumed that gross utility was convex and homogeneous degree 1
in taste parameters, while in (24) neither of these requirements are satised.
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4 Multi-Seller Analysis
4.1 One-stop shopping
In this section we discuss competition between oligopolists when there is one-stop shopping,
so that a consumer buys all her units/products from one seller or another. (In the next
section I discuss the alternative scenario where consumers can mix and match from
several suppliers.) For instance, competing bookstores might stock broadly the same range
of books, and consumers all else equal buy from their nearest store (but might buy more
there with a three for the price of twodeal). Shopping costs might mean that consumers
have a strong preference for buying all items from one seller. (When dining out people
rarely consume a main course from one restaurant and dessert from another.) And in
settings with quality choice or add-on products, it will usually only make sense to suppose
that the upgrade (or similar) must be purchased from the supplier of the basic product.
As in section 2.1, suppose a seller o¤ers consumers two options, a basic product and
a premium product, and we can think of the premium product as consisting of the basic
product bundled with an upgrade. The one-stop shopping assumption implies that a
consumer cannot buy the basic product from one seller and the upgrade from another.
Each seller incurs cost the c1 to supply the basic product and an extra cost c2 to supply
the upgrade.
As well as discussing how to derive equilibrium tari¤s in a competitive setting, a focus
in this section concerns the relationship between the price and the cost for the upgrade.
Empirical evidence on this point is mixed. McManus (2007, Table 4) studies how the
incremental price to obtain a larger cup of co¤ee compares with the associated cost of
ingredients, and nds the two to be similar in the case of sweet expressodrinks, while
other styles of co¤ee have larger markups. Verboven (1999) suggests that prices for a better
car engine and other upgrades are priced above cost. And it is well documented that many
kinds of add-ons, the price of which might be revealed to (or noticed by) consumers
only after they have chosen their basic product and are locked-in to their supplier, can be
expensive.
Perhaps the most straightforward situation is when sellers o¤er homogenous product
lines and compete in Cournot fashion.34 (This approach might apply well to situations
where capacity constraints are important, such as with air travel.) Here, the type-(v1; v2)
34For further discussion, see Wilson (1993, section 12.3) and Johnson and Myatt (2006a).
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consumer is willing to pay v1 for the basic product (from either seller) and an extra amount
v2 for the upgrade to the premium product (from either seller). One can in principle
calculate demand functions for the two product variants from Figure 1 and invert these to
obtain the inverse demand functions, and go on to determine the multiproduct Cournot
equilibrium.35 As usual, though, the analysis is much simplied when the demand prole
approach is valid, in which case the basic product and the upgrade can be considered as
separate markets without cross-price e¤ects.36 In these cases, the equilibrium price for the
upgrade is determined as in a standard single-product Cournot market; in particular, the
equilibrium price for the upgrade is above its cost.
Consider next situations in which sellers compete in tari¤s rather than in quantities.
Here, it makes sense to suppose that consumers care about which seller they buy from
that is, they have a brand preference for otherwise Bertrand competition entails prices
equal to costs for both product variants. This scenario is potentially more complicated than
monopoly supply, due to the additional margin on which a seller operates: if it increases
the price for one option an existing customer might (i) choose the other option from that
seller, (ii) switch to the best option available from a rival, or (iii) exit the market altogether.
To simplify the analysis somewhat, suppose there is full coverage over the relevant range of
prices, so that all consumers buy at least the basic product and margin (iii) does not apply.
From an individual sellers perspective, perhaps the main di¤erence when (ii) rather than
(iii) constitutes the consumers outside option is that there will likely be countervailing
incentives. As discussed in section 2.2, countervailing incentives a¤ect, and often simplify,
a sellers optimal tari¤.
In more detail, suppose there are two sellers, denoted A and B, and that consumers
are heterogeneous in two dimensions: their brand preference for seller A over seller B,
represented by parameter , and their valuation for the upgrade to the premium product
(from either seller), represented by . That is, a consumers valuation for the basic product
from seller i = A;B is V i, say, and her total valuation for the premium product from this
seller is V i + . Since there is full consumer coverage, only the di¤erence   V A   V B
matters for consumer choices.37 Suppose that seller i charges pi1 for its basic product and
35For instance, for the uniform square example from section 2.1, somewhat laborious calculations
reveal that the Cournot duopoly equilibrium tari¤ is (p1; p2) = ( 35 ;
1
30 ).
36The demand prole approach is valid in this oligopoly context when there is scalar consumer hetero-
geneity combined with a suitable hazard rate condition, as assumed in Johnson and Myatt (2006a).
37This set-up is similar to that studied by Verboven (1999). He assumes that V A and V B are extreme
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an incremental price pi2 for the upgrade to its premium variant. With this pair of tari¤s,
the pattern of consumer demand is shown on Figure 3, where the parameter  represents
horizontalpreferences while  captures the verticalpreferences of consumers. Notice
that intra-rm options are complements a decrease in a sellers basic price boosts demand
for that sellers upgrade while inter-rm options are substitutes in that any price rise from
one seller increases the number of consumers who buy from the rival.
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Figure 3: Pattern of demand with one-stop shopping (pA2 < p
B
2 )
One can calculate the proportion of consumers who choose each of the four options in
Figure 3 and so derive the equilibrium tari¤s o¤ered by the two sellers. The equilibrium
is particularly simple when  and  are stochastically independent, so that knowledge
of a consumers preference for seller A over seller B carries no information about her
willingness to pay for the upgrade. In this case, the discussion of countervailing incentives
in section 2.2 demonstrates that if one seller sets its upgrade price p2 equal to cost c2, the
rivals best response is to do the same. Thus, subject to mild regularity conditions on the
distribution of , an equilibrium exists in which both sellers price the upgrade at cost and
obtain all their prot from selling the basic product.38 The reason, as with monopoly, is
that the preferences of a sellers marginal customers do not di¤er systematically from the
value random variables, so that the di¤erence  has a logistic distribution.
38With distributional assumptions for  and , this result is shown in Verboven (1999, Proposition 1).
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preferences of its infra-marginal customers. This is another instance where the demand
prole perspective is valid: sellers can be considered to compete separately to supply the
basic product and the upgrade, and since the upgrade is an undi¤erentiated product in
this framework its price is forced down to cost.
In the context of nonlinear pricing, where c1 = c2 = c say, the issue arrises whether
sellers make more or less prot if they engage in nonlinear pricing relative to linear pricing.
(With monopoly supply, the seller must benet from price discrimination since it has more
instruments to work with, but in oligopoly the issue is less clear-cut.) When  and  are
independent, and when sellers are symmetric in the sense that  has density f() which
is symmetric about zero, the answer can be seen from Figure 3. With nonlinear pricing,
we know that in equilibrium p2 = c, and one can check that p1 = c + 1=(2f(0)) so that
industry prot is 1=(2f(0)). If instead sellers compete with linear prices, so that pA1 = p
A
2
and pB1 = p
B
2 , Figure 3 shows that a price cut by a seller yields an advantageous change
in the composition of that sellers demand, and the lower price attracts a disproportionate
number of two-unit buyers since the lower price is enjoyed over more units. Since two-unit
buyers are more protable than single-unit buyers when linear prices are used, a seller has
a strong incentive to undercut its rival. Conrming this intuition, one can show formally
that industry prot with linear pricing is strictly lower than with nonlinear pricing, so long
as there is a mixture of one- and two-unit demand with linear pricing.39
Similar analysis applies when consumers make continuous choices as in section 2.2.
Suppose that the type-(; ) consumer has gross utility u(q; )+ if she buys q units from
seller A and gross utility u(q; ) if she buys these units from B. Then if the parameters
 and  are stochastically independent and over the relevant range of tari¤s there is full
coverage, it is an equilibrium for each seller to o¤er a two-part tari¤ with price equal to
marginal cost.40 Note that both q and  could be multidimensional here, with a distinct
marginal cost for each product, in which case equilibrium multiproduct nonlinear tari¤s
take the very simple form of a two-part tari¤ with each price equal to the associated cost.
The requirement that  and  be stochastically independent plays essentially the same role
as the requirement in section 3.2 that averageand relativedemands be independent.
In either setting, the strategy to calculate the equilibrium tari¤ is to suppose hypothetically
that a seller can observe one aspect of the consumers private information, solve for the
39For a proof of this claim in a richer model, see Armstrong and Vickers (2010, Proposition 5).
40See Armstrong and Vickers (2001, Proposition 5) and Rochet and Stole (2002, Propositions 2 and 6).
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optimal tari¤ conditional on that observation (an easy one-dimensional problem which
screens on the basic of the remaining dimension of private information) and then note that
with stochastic independence this tari¤ does not depend on the observed parameter.
Returning to the discrete choice setting, Ellison (2005) suggests that one reason why
price is above cost for upgrades is correlation between horizontal and vertical preferences:
consumers with a high marginal utility of income are plausibly willing to pay less for an
upgrade and willing to pay less to buy from their preferred brand. In this situation we
expect that consumers with small  will be more likely to have  close to zero. When this
is the case, it is plausible that an equilibrium exists in which sellers charge more than cost
for the upgrade, since they enjoy greater market power over those consumers who have a
strong taste for the premium version.41
A second reason why upgrades are often expensive is that consumers do not pay suf-
cient attention to the add-on price until they are locked in to their chosen seller. This
might be because sellers shroudtheir add-on price until the consumer has committed to
purchase. (For instance, it is not easy to check mini-bar prices in advance when choosing a
hotel.) Alternatively, consumers might be over-pessimistic about their eventual demand for
the add-on product at the time they choose supplier, and even if add-on prices are clearly
displayed they do not give them adequate weight. (Learner drivers might underestimate
the likelihood they will fail their test on the rst attempt, and so do not value a tari¤ from
a driving school of the form free second course of lessons if you fail.)
To discuss this issue in more detail, suppose sellers do not reveal their upgrade price p2
until a consumer has committed to purchase at least the basic product from a seller, while
consumers are rational and anticipate their sellers incentives to choose this price.42 If 
and  are stochastically independent, each seller will choose its upgrade price to maximize
upgrade prot (p2  c2)Prf  p2g. Thus, upgrade prices are set at the monopoly level,
despite competition between sellers to supply the basic product. The monopoly prot
generated in the upgrade market stimulates competition for consumers, and depending on
41In fact, in Ellisons model the previous equilibrium in which the upgrade is priced at cost continues
to exist as well. Bonatti (2011) studies an alternative source of market power of upgrades, which is that
consumers have brand preferences over the supplier of the upgrade.
42More generally, the following argument carries over if consumers merely incur a cost for discovering
the add-on price from each seller. Consumers anticipate that both sellers will set monopoly add-on prices,
and so it is not worthwhile for them to incur the cost to discover this price in advance. When there is full
coverage, this argument also carries over if consumers are naive in the sense that they do not anticipate
they will need the add-on service and so choose seller only by comparing pA1 ad p
B
1 .
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the distribution for brand preferences , it may be that the basic product in equilibrium
is subsidised (p1 < c1). This bargain-then-ripo¤pattern of pricing is a common feature
of markets with lock-in when subsequent price is not revealed until the buyer is committed
to the seller.
This discussion of hidden upgrade charges is taken from Verboven (1999) and Ellison
(2005). Verboven assumes independence between  and , which implies that equilibrium
prot in the game in which sellers shroud their upgrade prices is the same as the game
when consumers see both prices from the start. In this case, hiding upgrade prices is not
a protable strategy. Ellison assumes positive correlation between  and , which implies
that prot is higher in the add-on pricing game in which sellers coordinate to conceal
upgrade prices. Ellison (1995, section V.C) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) study a related
model in which naive consumers are unaware of the add-on product if sellers shroud their
add-on prices, but if a single seller unshrouds its add-on price, all consumers become aware
of their demand for this service (and of a sellers incentive to set its add-on price if it keeps
this price shrouded). They show how it can be an equilibrium strategy for all sellers to
shroud their add-on prices, in contrast to Ellisons main model with rational consumers
where each seller unilaterally wishes to publicise its tari¤.
4.2 Mix-and-match shopping
We next consider situations in which to obtain her desired bundle of products a consumer
might mix and matchfrom di¤erent sellers. There are a number of situations where, with
linear pricing, some consumers choose to source products from several sellers, such as when
a traveller chooses the airline for each trip which o¤ers the most suitable departure time.
Here, a seller may have an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount if a consumer buys several
products, as with a frequent ier program, and such tactics encourage more consumers to
become loyal one-stop shoppers.
To discuss this issue, suppose that two sellers, denoted A and B, each supply the same
pair of products, denoted 1 and 2. (In the airline context, these might be two routes, say.)
Each consumer wants at most one unit of each product. Even in this stylized setting, a
consumer has a large number of shopping possibilities: she can buy each product i from
seller A or seller B or not at all, so there are nine possibilities in total, each of which has
an associated value to the consumer. To simplify the analysis somewhat, suppose that
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valuations are additive, in that if vji is a consumers valuation for buying product i from
seller j, her total value for the bundle where product 1 is purchased from seller j and
product 2 is purchased from seller k is just vj1 + v
k
2 . (In particular, this implies there is
no intrinsic benet, such as saving on shopping costs, in buying both items from the same
seller.) In addition, suppose that consumer valuations are such that, over the relevant
range of tari¤s, every consumer wishes to buy both products. Together, these assumptions
imply that consumer decisions are determined by two horizontal taste parameters, 1 and
2, where i is a consumers brand preference for seller As product i over Bs version.
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Figure 4: Pattern of demand when duopolists engage in bundling
Suppose seller j chooses price pj1 for product 1 on its own, price p
j
2 for product 2 on its
own, and o¤ers a discount j  0 if a consumer buys both items. Thus, a consumer prefers
to buy both items from A to buying product 1 from A and product 2 from B, say, if
vA1 + v
A
2   (pA1 + pA2   A)  vA1 + vB2   (pA1 + pB2 ) ;
i.e., if 2  pA2  pB2  A. The resulting pattern of consumer demand is depicted on Figure
4. Consumers with very asymmetric brand preferences who prefer one seller for product
1 but the other for product 2 will mix and match, while others are one-stop shoppers.
The number of one-stop shoppers increases with the size of bundle discounts, which convert
otherwise independent products into complements.
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The analysis is most transparent when the two sellers are symmetric, in the sense that
their costs are the same and consumer tastes are symmetric in the sense that the density
of taste parameters, f , satises f(1;2) = f( 1; 2). In this scenario, it is natural
to suppose each seller o¤ers the same tari¤ in equilibrium, say (p1; p2; ). If sellers do not
engage in bundling ( = 0) then every consumer buys each product from her preferred
seller, i.e., a consumer buys product i from A if and only if i > 0. This implies total
welfare is maximized. In this setting with full coverage, then, bundling is sure to lower
welfare, since it induces excessive one-stop shopping. (Frequent ier programmes encourage
travellers sometimes to y at inconvenient times, say, in order to make use of air miles.)
The fraction of consumers who mix-and-match with the tari¤ (p1; p2; ) depends only on ,
and denote the number of two-stop shoppers by the decreasing function (). Here,  can
be considered to be the demand for two-stop shopping as a function of the implicit price
of two-stop shopping, .
There is an intuitive formula for the size of the equilibrium discount, . Relative to the
symmetric situation where both sellers choose tari¤ (p1; p2; ), suppose a seller increases
both of its stand-alone prices by some small amount " and increases its bundle discount
by 2". This deviation keeps the sellers bundle price unchanged but increases a consumers
cost of two-stop shopping by ". Using Figure 4, one can check that, regardless of the
stand-alone prices (p1; p2), the impact of this change on the sellers prot to rst order is
" () + 1
2
0()

. Thus, the equilibrium discount makes the term [] vanish, so that
 
0()
()
= 2 (28)
and the elasticity of two-stop shopping is equal to 2.43 In particular, so long as (0) > 0,
so there are some two-stop shoppers with linear pricing, the equilibrium involves a positive
bundle discount. This contrasts with the monopoly analysis, when a monopolist only
had an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount if expression (21) was satised. Expression
(28) can be interpreted as an instance of the situation where two single-product sellers
costlessly supply perfect complements, in which case the combined product has elasticity
2 in equilibrium. In the current context, a mix-and-match shopping bundle involves each
seller supplying one complementary component, and each seller independently chooses the
combined price of two-stop shopping, , via its choice of stand-alone prices. Just as sellers
43See Armstrong and Vickers (2010, Proposition 1), who show the formula is also valid when consumers
have an intrinsic shopping cost when buying from two sellers.
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who supply complementary products set an ine¢ ciently high total price, here sellers in
equilibrium choose an ine¢ ciently deep bundle discount.
To illustrate, suppose that (1;2) is uniformly distributed with density 14 on the
square [ 1; 1]2, in which case () = 1
2
(1   )2 and (28) implies that the equilibrium
bundle discount is  = 1
2
and one in eight consumers chooses to mix and match. With
costless production, one can then show using Figure 4 that equilibrium stand-alone prices
are p1 = p2 = 1112 . By contrast, when the sellers compete with linear tari¤s (so  = 0), half
the consumers mix and match and the equilibrium linear prices are p1 = p2 = 1. In this
example, then, when sellers engage in bundling all prices fall relative to the situation with
linear pricing. It follows that all consumers are better o¤ (even though they sometimes buy
a less preferred product), while sellers obtain lower prot with bundling than with linear
pricing. Sellers are forced to play a prisoners dilemma: each has a unilateral incentive to
o¤er a bundle discount for the same reason as the monopolist in section 3.1 does but
when both do so their prot falls.44
Thus we see a contrast between situations with one-stop shopping, where nonlinear
pricing usually boosts prot relative to linear pricing, and with mix-and-match shopping,
where bundling sometimes acts to intensify competition. Intuition for why bundling can in-
tensify competition is most transparent in the case of pure bundling versus linear pricing.45
In more detail, suppose that the brand preference parameters 1 and 2 are independent
draws from some common distribution with density f() which is symmetric about  = 0.
When sellers compete in linear prices, product by product, and there is costless produc-
tion, the equilibrium price for each product is p1 = p2 = 1=(2f(0)). Here, the density f(0)
captures the size of the competitive margin between these symmetric sellers, and deter-
mines a sellers own-price elasticity of demand. Suppose instead that sellers compete only
in bundles, so that a consumer must buy both products from one or other seller. If P i is
seller is price for the bundle, a consumer will buy from A if 1+2  PA PB. If f^( ) is
the induced density for the average brand preference  = 1
2
(1+2), then the equilibrium
bundle price satises P=2 = 1=(2f^(0)). Thus the per-product bundle price, P=2, is lower
44Papers which discuss this competition intensifyingproperty of competitive mixed bundling include
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Anderson and Leruth (1993), and Thanassoulis (2007). Armstrong and
Vickers (2010, Proposition 4) nd conditions which ensure that when sellers engage in mixed bundling
their prot is lower, and consumer surplus higher, relative to the situation with linear pricing.
45Important papers which study this comparison are Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides
(1989).
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than the price without bundling if f^(0) > f(0). In regular cases the density for the average
of i.i.d. variables is more concentrated about the mean than is the underlying density. In
these cases the per-product price is lower when sellers compete in bundles than when they
compete product-by-product, due to the homogenizing impact of bundling on consumer
valuations as discussed in the introduction.46
Armstrong and Vickers (2010) extend this unit-demand bundling framework so that
consumers buy continuous quantities of the two products. Similar to Armstrong and Vick-
ers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) in the one-stop shopping context, in symmetric
cases with full coverage and stochastic independence between horizontal and vertical taste
parameters, an equilibrium exists in which sellers o¤er two-part tari¤s where the marginal
price for each product is equal to marginal cost and a seller o¤ers a discount on its xed
charge when it supplies a consumer with both products. As before, the equilibrium is de-
rived by supposing that sellers observe a consumers vertical preferences but not her brand
preferences, and showing that the resulting tari¤ does not depend on brand preferences.
This framework allows for a more nuanced analysis of the welfare impact of nonlinear pric-
ing, since relative to linear pricing marginal prices are lower (which is good for welfare)
while the bundle discount induces excessive one-stop shopping (which harms welfare).
Inter-rm bundling: The previous discussion considered bundle discounts o¤ered when
consumers buy several products from a given multiproduct seller. We next focus on sit-
uations where bundling strategies are implemented across sellers, either unilaterally by a
single seller or in a coordinated fashion.
A single-product seller might, if feasible, have an incentive to o¤er consumers a discount
for its product if they also purchase a product supplied by another seller. For example,
a museum might o¤er a discount on its entry fee if a visitor shows she went to another
museum or has a travel card for the city. To study this situation, suppose there are two
products, labelled 1 and 2, each of which is supplied by one seller, and consumers have
valuations (v1; v2; vb) as described in section 3.1. If the price for product 2 is xed at p2,
when seller 1 o¤ers its product at price p1 but o¤ers a discount  on its product if the
46Zhou (2015) suggests that this result might only apply when there are few sellers, however. With
more than two sellers, a rm is competing against the best o¤er from its several rivals and so the relevant
competitive margin is not  = 0 as with duopoly but in the right-hand part of the distribution. While the
average of i.i.d. variables is often more concentrated about the mean, it is less concentrated in the tails,
and as a result the per-product price can rise with bundling when there are enough rivals.
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consumer also purchases product 2, using the notation from section 3.1 its prot is
 = (p1   c1)Q1   Qb :
In this scenario, the supplier of product 2 continues to receive its price p2 if the consumer
buys the bundle, and so the bundle discount is funded entirely by seller 1. Similar to
condition (21), one can show that it is protable for the seller to introduce a unilateral
discount of this form when Nb=N1 strictly decreases with p1, so that bundle demand is
more elastic than total demand for the sellers product with respect to its price. In the
doubly independentcase, where valuations are additive and stochastically independent,
the seller has no incentive to o¤er a discount of this form, since whether or not a consumer
has purchased product 2 has no bearing on her demand for product 1. However, if the two
products are partial substitutes, so that vb < v1+v2, or if valuations are additive but there
is negative correlation between v1 and v2, then the fact that a consumer has purchased
product 2 is bad news for her propensity to buy product 1. In such cases the seller
often has an incentive to o¤er a discount to these consumers, to reect their more elastic
demand.47
More common than this kind of unilateral bundling is for sellers to combine to form an
alliance which coordinates on a joint bundling strategy. For instance, tourist attractions
in a city might coordinate to o¤er a tourist pass at a discount over the sum of their
individual entry fees, where they agree on the price for the pass and how the revenue from
the pass is allocated between them. In roughly symmetric cases, it may be straightforward
for sellers to agree on a joint bundling arrangement. For instance, they could coordinate on
a bundle discount, which they fund equally, but remain free to determine their standalone
prices. Since bundle discounts convert substitute products into complements (see section
3.1), sellers may be able to use a bundle discount as a means with which to relax competition
(Armstrong, 2013, section 5).
As discussed in section 3.1, the use of bundling often means that the maximum revenue
from selling several products together is strictly greater than the revenue obtained from
selling products separately, and this implies it is hard to reward each sellers incremental
contribution to revenue at the same time as balance the alliances budget. This problem of
super-additivitycan vanish in the limit when many separate sellers combine their prod-
ucts into a large bundle. (For example, academic journals or television channels might
47For further details on this topic, see Schmalensee (1982), Lewbel (1985), and Armstrong (2013).
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combine to form a bundle, or musicians might o¤er their content on a music streaming
service.) Using the framework discussed in section 3.1, suppose that seller i = 1; :::; N
has a product for which consumers have valuation vi which has expected value i in the
population of consumers and which costs nothing to supply. (Consumers have additive
and stochastically independent valuations across products.) Using a large numbers argu-
ment, the supplier of a large bundle of products, say B  f1; :::; Ng, can sell its bundle to
approximately all consumers for bundle price approximately equal to
P
i2B i. Thus, seller
is contribution to bundle revenue is simply its expected valuation, i, regardless of which
other products are included in the bundle. Sellers can combine to sell their products in
a large bundle, and divide up the resulting revenue according to each products expected
valuation. Such an arrangement benets each seller, relative to supplying its product with
a stand-alone price, and boosts welfare, but harms consumers. An alternative arrangement
would be for an independent intermediary to emerge, which buys content from individual
sellers and retails the bundle to nal consumers. If there were several such intermediaries,
competition for content might force them to pay each seller their contribution, i, to the
bundle revenue.48 If for some reason there was a dominant intermediary, though, it might
only have pay a seller its outside option (i.e., the prot it makes if it sells its product on
a stand-alone basis). The size of payments from bundling intermediaries to their content
providers (be they academic journals or musicians) is a frequent source of controversy.
5 Conclusions
This paper has surveyed a number of topics and techniques concerning nonlinear pricing.
Where possible, I have tried to make use of familiar consumer demand functions rather than
the more abstract typesoften emphasized in models of nonlinear pricing. In particular,
the demand prole approach associated with Bob Wilson was shown to be a useful and
economically intuitive way to solve many nonlinear pricing problems in the single-product
context. Even when this approach cannot generate the optimal tari¤ itself, standard de-
mand functions could be used to determine whether a quantity or a bundle discount was
protable.
In most situations where the demand prole approach cannot be used, consumers di¤er
48Armstrong (2010) discusses this point in the context of academic journals, when the intermediaries
are commercial publishers.
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along several dimensions. They have taste parameters for each of a number of products,
say, or in competitive situations they may di¤er both in their horizontaland vertical
preferences. Here, an often useful trick for solving the nonlinear pricing problem was
to suppose the seller could observe a subset of a consumers private information, in which
case it can screen on the remaining dimension(s). With stochastic independence of the
appropriate kind the sellers tari¤ does not actually depend on the hypothetically observed
parameters, in which case the optimal tari¤ when there is multi-dimensional private infor-
mation has been found. Another useful trick was to consider cases with many products,
when the law of large numbers often operates to wash out most of the sellers uncertainty
about a consumers willingness-to-pay for its products.
In the interests of space and focus I have neglected several important aspects of non-
linear pricing. For instance, I have not covered dynamic nonlinear pricing. If competing
suppliers sell over time to consumers who purchase repeatedly, a seller might choose its
price contingent on whether a consumer is an existing customer or not. When they cannot
commit to future prices a seller will often set a higher price to a past customer (which is
a kind of quantity premium), and at the same attempt to poach its rivals customers
with a low price. The resulting switching between sellers can harm welfare, i.e., there is
excessive two-stop shopping, in contrast to the static model in section 4.2 where there
was too much one-stop shopping.49
Finally, and remaining with the dynamic theme, I have said nothing about the use
of nonlinear tari¤s to deter entry or induce exit by rivals. For instance, an incumbent
manufacturer might o¤er its retailers a lower wholesale price if they do not stock a rival
manufacturers products, a reversal of the inter-rm bundling arrangements discussed in
section 4.2, which might harm the rivals ability to compete. Alternatively, a multiproduct
incumbent which faces a potential rival for one product may choose to engage in (pure)
bundling in order to commit itself to compete hard should the rival decide to enter.50 As we
saw in section 4.2, when sellers compete on a margin where they win or lose two products
rather than one they tend to compete aggressively, and for this reason the potential rival
may decide not to enter if the incumbent bundles its products. This important topic
deserves a survey to itself.
49For instance, see Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
50For instance, see Whinston (1990).
40
References
Adams, W., and J. Yellen (1976): Commodity Bundling and the Burden of
Monopoly,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(3), 475498.
Anderson, E., and J. Dana (2009): When is Price Discrimination Protable?,Man-
agement Science, 55(6), 980989.
Anderson, S., and L. Leruth (1993): Why Firms May Prefer Not to Price Dis-
criminate via Mixed Bundling,International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11(1),
4961.
Armstrong, M. (1996): Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing,Econometrica, 64(1), 5176.
(1999): Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm,Review of Economic
Studies, 66(1), 151168.
(2010): Collection Sales: Good or Bad for Journals?,Economic Inquiry, 48(1),
163176.
(2013): A More General Theory of Commodity Bundling,Journal of Economic
Theory, 148(2), 448472.
Armstrong, M., and J.-C. Rochet (1999): Multi-Dimensional Screening: A Users
Guide,European Economic Review, 43(4), 959979.
Armstrong, M., and J. Vickers (2001): Competitive Price Discrimination,Rand
Journal of Economics, 32(4), 579605.
(2010): Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Bundling, Review of Economic
Studies, 77(1), 3060.
Bakos, Y., and E. Brynjolfsson (1999): Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Prof-
its, and E¢ ciency,Management Science, 45(12), 16131630.
(2000): Bundling and Competition on the Internet,Marketing Science, 19(1),
6382.
Bonatti, A. (2011): Brand-Specic Tastes for Quality,International Journal of Indus-
trial Orgnaization, 29(5), 562575.
41
Chen, Y. (1997): Paying Customers to Switch,Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 6(4), 877897.
Chen, Y., and M. Riordan (2013): Protability of Product Bundling, International
Economic Review, 54(1), 3557.
Chu, C. S., P. Leslie, and A. Sorensen (2011): Bundle-Size Pricing as an Approxi-
mation to Mixed Bundling,American Economic Review, 101(1), 263303.
DellaVigna, S., and U. Malmendier (2004): Contract Design and Self-Control:
Theory and Evidence,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 353402.
(2006): Paying Not to go to the Gym,American Economic Review, 96, 694719.
Deneckere, R., and P. McAfee (1996): Damaged Goods,Journal of Economics and
Management Science, 5(2), 149174.
Economides, N. (1989): The Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network
Externalities,American Economic Review, 71(5), 11651181.
Eliaz, K., and R. Spiegler (2008): Consumer Optimism and Price Discrimination,
Theoretical Economics, 3(4), 459497.
Ellison, G. (2005): A Model of Add-on Pricing, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
120(2), 585637.
Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (2000): Customer Poaching and Brand Switching,
Rand Journal of Economics, 31(4), 634657.
Gabaix, X., and D. Laibson (2006): Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
121(2), 505540.
Geng, X., M. Stinchcombe, and A. Whinston (2005): Bundling Information Goods
of Decreasing Value,Management Science, 51(4), 662667.
Goldman, B., H. Leland, and D. Sibley (1984): Optimal Nonuniform Prices,Re-
view of Economic Studies, 51(2), 305319.
42
Grubb, M. (2009): Selling to Overcondent Consumers,Amercian Economic Review,
99(5), 17701807.
Hart, S., and N. Nisan (2014): How Good are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple
Goods?,mimeo.
Itoh, M. (1983): Monopoly, Product Di¤erentiation and Economic Welfare,Journal of
Economic Theory, 31(1), 88104.
Jahedi, S. (2011): A Taste for Bargains,mimeo, University of Arkansas.
Johnson, J., and D. Myatt (2003): Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting
Brands and Product Line Pruning,American Economic Review, 93(3), 748774.
(2006a): Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly,Rand Journal of Economics, 37(3),
583601.
(2006b): On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing and Product
Design,American Economic Review, 96(3), 756784.
(2015): The Properties of Product Line Prices,International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization, forthcoming.
Koszegi, B. (2015): Behavioral Contract Theory, Journal of Economic Literature,
52(4), 10751118.
Laffont, J.-J., E. Maskin, and J.-C. Rochet (1987): Optimal Nonlinear pricing
with Two-Dimensional Characteristics,in Information, Incentives and Economic Mech-
anisms, ed. by T. Groves, and S. Reiter, pp. 256266. University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, MN.
Lewbel, A. (1985): Bundling of Substitutes or Complements,International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 3(1), 101107.
Lewis, T., and D. Sappington (1989): Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems,
Journal of Economic Theory, 49(2), 294313.
Long, J. (1984): Comments on Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling,Journal
of Business, 57(1), S235S246.
43
Manelli, A., and D. Vincent (2006): Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for
a Multiple-good Monopolist,Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1), 135.
(2007): Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the
Multiple-good Monopoly,Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 153185.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley (1984): Monopoly with Incomplete Information, Rand
Journal of Economics, 15(2), 171196.
Matutes, C., and P. Regibeau (1988): Mix and Match: Product Compatibility with-
out Network Externalities,Rand Journal of Economics, 19(2), 221234.
(1992): Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a Duopoly,
Journal of Industrial Economics, 40(1), 3754.
McAfee, R. P., J. McMillan, and M. Whinston (1989): Multiproduct Monopoly,
Commodity Bundling and Correlation of Values, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
104(2), 371384.
McManus, B. (2007): Pricing in an Oligopoly Market: The Case of Speciality Co¤ee,
Rand Journal of Economics, 38(2), 512532.
Menicucci, D., S. Hurkens, and D.-S. Jeon (2014): On the Optimality of Pure
Bundling for a Monopolist,mimeo.
Mirrlees, J. (1971): An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Taxation,Review of
Economic Studies, 38, 175208.
Mussa, M., and S. Rosen (1978): Monopoly and Product Quality, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 18(2), 301317.
Myerson, R. (1981): Optimal Auction Design,Mathematics of Operations Research,
6, 5873.
Pavlov, G. (2011): Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods,The B.E. Journal of
Theoretical Economics, 11(1, Advances), Article 3.
Riley, J., and R. Zeckhauser (1983): Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle,
When to Hold Firm,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(2), 267289.
44
Rochet, J.-C., and P. Choné (1998): Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screen-
ing,Econometrica, 66(4), 783826.
Rochet, J.-C., and L. Stole (2002): Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation,
Review of Economic Studies, 69(1), 277311.
(2003): The Economics of Multidimensional Screening, in Advances in Eco-
nomics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, ed. by
M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Schmalensee, R. (1982): Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies,Jour-
nal of Law and Economics, 25(1), 6771.
Spence, M. (1975): Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation,Bell Journal of Economics,
6(2), 417429.
(1977): Nonlinear Pricing and Welfare, Journal of Public Economics, 8(1),
118.
Spiegler, R. (2011): Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, UK.
Stigler, G. (1963): United States v. Loews Inc.: A Note on Block Booking,Supreme
Court Review, pp. 152157.
Thanassoulis, J. (2007): Competitive Mixed Bundling and Consumer Surplus,Jour-
nal of Economics and Management Strategy, 16(2), 437467.
Varian, H. (1985): Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,American Economic Re-
view, 75(4), 870875.
Verboven, F. (1999): Product Line Rivalry and Market Segmentation - With an Appli-
cation to Automobile Optional Engine Pricing,Journal of Industrial Economics, 47(4),
399425.
Whinston, M. (1990): Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion,American Economic Review,
80(4), 837859.
45
Wilson, R. (1993): Nonlinear Pricing. Oxford University Press, New York.
Yang, H., and L. Ye (2008): Nonlinear Pricing, Market Coverage, and Competition,
Theoretical Economics, 3(1), 123153.
Zhou, J. (2015): Competitive Bundling,mimeo.
46
